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Neoliberal economics play a significant role in US social organization, imposing market 
logics on public services and driving the cultural valorization of free market ideology. 
The neoliberal ‘project of inequality’ is upheld by an authoritarian system of 
punishment built around the social control of the underclass—among them 
unauthorized immigrants. This work lays out the theory of the punishment 
marketplace: a conceptualization of how US systems of punishment both enable the 
neoliberal project of inequality, and are themselves subject to market colonization. 
The theory describes the rescaling of federal authority to local centers of political 
power. Criminal justice policy activism by local governments is punishment 
entrepreneurship: an accumulative approach to securing fiscal gain, political hegemony, 
security, and capitalized power. Local immigration enforcement entrepreneurship 
targets unauthorized and other deportable immigrants. This punitive immigration 
control reinforces racially structured social relations by obscuring the diminishing 
returns neoliberal globalization provides working class whites. 
Keywords 
Deportation, detention, immigration, local governance, neoliberalism, political 
economy, punishment  
The well-documented extremes of recent US immigration enforcement give the 
impression of a sui generis phenomenon, born as the Trump administration has married 
nativist rhetoric and authoritarian politics to what is arguably the most overtly 
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neoliberal policy approach in late modern history. Understanding this apparent shift 
requires viewing it as a continuity rather than an interruption, the logical next step in 
the neoliberal project defined by David Harvey as ‘in the first instance a [set] of 
political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills’, wherein ‘[t]he [sole] role 
of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices’ (Harvey, 2007: 2). An understanding of punitive practices as the exercise of 
state power might suggest that it is the authoritarian impulse that has recently pushed 
state-mandated punishments to overstep this more limited role. However, Harvey’s 
third and final defining tenet states that ‘if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, 
water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they 
must be created, by state action if necessary’ (Harvey, 2007: 2). Harvey’s parenthetical 
list omits what Beckett and Murakawa (2012) have referred to as ‘the shadow carceral 
state’, a broad array of punitive structures and practices that includes civil immigration 
enforcement. The current administration appears to have recognized overtly the extent 
to which the structures of immigration control can be placed in the service of a 
punishment marketplace. The most dramatic examples of this recognition shaping 
policy include the speed with which the Trump administration reversed Obama-era 
attempts to end the federal Bureau of Prisons’ contracts with for-profit corrections 
corporations—and the even swifter recovery of these corporations’ share prices upon 
the news of Trump’s election (Lurie, 2016; Sessions, 2017). 
The punishment marketplace is a theory intended to explain the dynamics of 
contemporary systems of punishment that are both integral to the operation of the 
neoliberal political economy and internally subject to the market logics that define it. 
Prior to the current administration, federal policy inertia—and the resultant 
weakening of federal authority—empowered political-economic elites at the state and 
local levels1 to approach policy innovation as entrepreneurship: a project of benefit 
accumulation intended to concentrate fiscal profit, sociopolitical hegemony, security, 
and cultural dominance in private hands. The US political economy of punishment 
appears no longer to serve the narrow function theorized by Rusche and Kirchheimer 
(2003 [1939]) as a tool for disciplining low-paid workers and deterring behaviors 
likely to reduce the value of their labor. This is now only one of many possible 
functions, in service of a political-economic elite limited only by their 
entrepreneurial acumen in the extraction of benefit through punitive policy 
innovation. Fiscal profit is one such benefit, and its pursuit provides the capitalist 
logic by which the marketplace operates (Clifford and Silver-Greenberg, 2014; 
Shelden and Brown, 2000; Trujillo-Pagan, 2014). 
I propose the punishment marketplace as a successor to Rusche and Kirchheimer’s 
political economy of punishment, refined through the lens of Bernard Harcourt’s 
neoliberal penality: if ‘[e]very system of production tends to discover punishments 
which correspond to its productive relationships’ (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 2003 
[1939]: 5), then late modern neoliberal systems of production require distinctly 
neoliberal systems of punishment. The punishment marketplace is neoliberalism turned 
back upon itself, with market economics colonizing the authoritarian structures and 
systems of power that make it possible and define its limits. As a market-place, it 
reflects the rescaling of the contemporary neoliberal project, away from the nation-
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state, and the recentering of power to global and local levels. Recognizing 
neoliberalism as the governing framework for an accumulative project of inequality 
requires the further recognition that this accumulation is not simply a fiscal pursuit, but 
a political-economic one, in which elites compete for a range of capitals: economic and 
political, social and cultural, security and hegemony alike. Here I take Bichler and 
Nitzan’s (2014: 252) suggestion that scholars ‘discard the politics/economics duality 
and instead think of capital as power and capitalism as a mode of power’. Practices of 
punishment allow a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of ‘capitalized power’, a 
flexibility that is characteristic of neoliberal policy entrepreneurship. 
In the sections that follow, I will propose an understanding of contemporary US 
immigration control rooted not in the extremes of the Trump era, but in the increasingly 
localized approaches of states, counties, and municipalities enabled by the policies of 
the preceding Obama and Bush administrations. While this article is concerned chiefly 
with the specifics of US immigration control, the theory that it proposes—of a 
distinctly neoliberal system of punitive immigration control in turn reinscribed with 
market-driven, neoliberal structures of entrepreneurial accumulation—has clear 
parallels and applications in the approaches of other nations, Australia and the UK 
arguably chief among them (see, for example, Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Welch, 2014; 
Welch and Schuster, 2005. To establish the unique context that has allowed the US 
punishment marketplace (and immigration enforcement entrepreneurship within it) to 
thrive, I discuss the neoliberal colonization of the language of public goods (or 
benefits), the intersection of neoliberalism with US neoconservatism and its 
authoritarian outcomes, and the expanding conceptual and practical relationships 
between neoliberal punitiveness through criminal justice practices and immigration 
control. Finally, I identify the structural and technological shifts in a global political 
economy that have allowed punitive immigration control to be deployed as a key 
mediator in the late modern capital/labor dialectic. In order to dramatize the 
entrepreneurial nature of locally devolved immigration enforcement, I sketch brief 
parallel case studies of state-level ‘immigration enforcement marketplaces’ in the US 
states of Georgia and New Jersey, respectively. These states developed distinct, locally 
driven enforcement entrepreneurship largely under the federal auspices of the 
comparatively technocratic Obama administration, to devastating effect for the targeted 
individuals and communities. 
Advancing the neoliberal project  of inequalit y: Language, 
cult ure, and author it y 
Neoliberal ideology sets the cultural, political, and policy framework that makes the 
contemporary US detention and deportation system possible. It positions the goal of 
capital accumulation as a primary, intrinsic good. As an ideology, it allows for 
deliberately obscuring language use and terminology. Sayer (2014:[ AQ1] ) identifies 
the neoliberal tendency to use the term ‘investment’ in a manner that ‘allows people to 
mistake wealth extraction for wealth creation’: 
This indifference as to whether individuals or institutions are funding genuine investment or 
merely vehicles for providing money for the ‘investor’ is a major irrationality of capitalism, 
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and the way we use the word ‘investment’ helps to conceal it. […] While you might get a 
return on a genuine investment, you might not […] but it could still be an investment in the 
first sense if it brings benefits to someone. 
Sayer’s observation on the (deliberately) obscuring nature of neoliberal language use 
raises important questions about the framing of government-provided services as public 
goods (or ‘benefits’). If federal immigration control represents a public good, who is 
intended to benefit from its provision, and how are they intended to benefit?2 In the 
language of utilitarianism, ‘[a]n action [of government] may be said to conform to the 
principle of utility when its tendency to increase the happiness of the community is 
greater than any tendency it has to lessen it’ (Bentham, 2010 [1823]: 7). The USA’s 
punitive approach to immigration control can be understood as neoliberal rent-seeking 
obscured by the language of public benefit. This deliberate obscuring of the definition 
of benefit—concealing rent-seeking within the conceptual framework of good 
governance—is a cultural phenomenon as much as it is political obfuscation. 
Immigration control is understood as a public good by a significant proportion of the 
US populace, making it particularly vulnerable to private rent-seeking. 
One of the primary conceits of ‘free market’ ideology is that the wealth generated by 
market competition is widely distributed. Not re-distributed, as redistribution is a 
hallmark of Keynesian progressive tax policy, but rather permeating every level of 
society through the ‘trickle-down’ effect ostensibly associated with supply-side 
economics. This is a simplified version of Francis Fukuyama’s thesis in his seminal 
1992 essay The End of History and The Last Man, where he claims that, due to 
globalization, ‘liberal principles in economics—the “free market”—have spread, and 
have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity’ (Fukuyama, 
2006 [1992]: xiii), in both developed and ‘Third World’ countries. Through access to 
global markets, Fukuyama (2006 [1992]: 77) contends, ever-increasing specialization 
made possible by economies of scale leads to ‘rational organization of labor, dictat[ing] 
certain consistent, large-scale changes in social structure’: among them urbanization, 
increasing mobility, and the breakdown of traditional or ‘tribal’ social structures. 
It is arguable from a late modern perspective that Fukuyama’s predictions have not 
aged well. Contemporary urbanization is dogged by residential segregation and 
gentrification; increased mobility manifests in stateless populations scattered around 
the globe; and tribalism has retrenched, driving pronounced rightward shifts in US and 
European politics. The outcomes Fukuyama predicted have been enjoyed as positive 
fruits of neoliberalism almost exclusively by a narrow global economic elite—an 
indication that, in order to create wealth, neoliberalism must simultaneously create 
poverty: 
This kind of poverty does not relate to a lack of ‘development’ and is not the symptom of a 
‘backwardness’ that economic growth would reduce. Instead it is one which is created anew 
by dispositifs of segmentation, division and differentiation within a society which is 
‘objectively’ wealthy. Neoliberal poverty is quite different in form from that suffered by 
people in countries which are ‘materially poor’ since it arises from a political will. 
 
(Lazzarato, 2009: 128, emphasis added) 
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The competitive dynamic of the ‘free market’ requires ‘losers’ as well as ‘winners’ to 
justify its existence. More than simply a symbolic or ideological conceit, this 
arrangement is a practical effect of neoliberalism’s accumulative purpose. To facilitate 
continually increasing capital accumulation by political-economic elites, neoliberal 
policy needs to engineer a concomitant decrease in the wealth and political power of 
labor. While not a zero-sum game—the ‘equal and opposite’ gain and loss implied by a 
closed system—wealth is not ‘created’ but given and taken in systemic exchange. 
Neoliberalism, then, is a project of inequality, facilitated by cultural and social 
relations as much as by politics and policy-making. US neoliberalism finds its cultural 
expression in the seemingly incompatible ideological construct of movement 
conservatism. US conservatism stands for more than simply the revanchist return to 
traditional mores and social arrangements. It is most importantly the manifestation of 
neoliberal economic ideology in personal codes and individual world-views: 
[N]eoliberalism is not confined to an expressly economic sphere, nor does it cast the market 
as natural and self-regulating even in the economic sphere. Part of what makes neoliberalism 
‘neo’ is that it depicts free markets, free trade, and entrepreneurial rationality as achieved and 
normative, […] a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational economic 
actors in every sphere of life. 
 
(Brown, 2006: 694[ AQ2]  
This political culture casts ‘citizens as individual entrepreneurs […] whose moral 
autonomy is measured by their capacity for “self-care”—their ability to provide for 
their own needs and service their own ambitions’ (Brown, 2006: 694), tying 
accumulative success in the neoliberal free market to a kind of moral superiority. 
Thus, in the (neoliberal) moral calculus of conservatism, individual circumstances 
result from entrepreneurial successes or failures in navigating the market, rather than 
systemic problems or structural inequities. The conservative stance on welfare and 
other government benefits is a manifestation of this calculus: the state should not 
interfere with the market to ‘reward failure’, but rather let the dynamics of the market 
itself reward virtue, as it is designed to. This aversion to state benefits, however, is not 
generally an expression of a commitment to logically consistent, libertarian ideas about 
the appropriate limits of state power. On the contrary, contemporary US conservatism 
has shown itself to favor an authoritarian state—most recently in the ascendance of 
Donald Trump to the nation’s presidency. Trump’s apparent electoral populism—
jettisoned dramatically upon taking office—has been read incorrectly by some pundits 
(see, for example, Jacobin, 2017; Leopold, 2017) as a repudiation of neoliberalism; in 
fact, it is a clear example of what Ian Bruff (2014: 121) describes as ‘authoritarian 
neoliberalism’, where the ‘solution [to the manifest failures of capitalism to engender 
broad prosperity] entails not the fundamental reform or the overturning of capitalism 
but the demand for “increased ethical responsibility by individuals”’. This 
interpretation is consistent with Bernard Harcourt’s (2010) notion of neoliberal 
penality, in that, under the populist logic of authoritarian US neoconservatism, any 
violation of the rules of exchange that define the free market—that is, through 
criminality—should be punished swiftly and severely through state exercise of coercive 
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force. Since ‘illegal immigrant’ status is an expression of criminality in the tautological 
rationale of nativism, neoliberal conservatism holds that the state is obligated to punish 
unauthorized immigrants as criminals. Thus nativism, discussed by scholars such as 
Varsanyi (2011) as a site of ideological resistance to a globalist neoliberalism that 
encourages immigration, is in fact an expression of its cultural logic. Globalist 
neoliberalism encourages labor migration—but relies on popular nativism to further its 
project of inequality, by ensuring that immigrant labor is consistently disadvantaged in 
its interactions with capital. 
Neoliberalism and contemporary pat terns of immigrat ion 
In addition to setting the broad economic, cultural, and political conditions necessary for the 
operation of the punishment marketplace, neoliberalism has also played a specific role in 
developing contemporary patterns of immigration to the USA. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 is a clear example of neoliberal international trade 
policy, in the service of a globalized economy and the free movement of capital across 
international borders: ‘giv[ing] free rein to private investments in the market, while keeping 
the bearers of labor power—workers—rooted in their national states’ (Otero, 2011: 387). 
NAFTA ended protective tariffs for staple crops in Mexico, contributing to the collapse of 
Mexico’s agricultural economy and plunging millions of Mexican farmers and their 
families into food insecurity (Nevins, 2007). 
NAFTA’s effects contributed to a broader dynamic, driven by demographic realities, 
of immigration from the developing nations of the global South to the established 
economies of the global North. Aging populations and relatively low birth rates in 
wealthy countries simultaneously produce large numbers of low-wage jobs and a 
shrinking native-born labor pool to fill them (Castles et al., 2013; Massey et al., 2003). 
Because neoliberal ideology dictates diametrically opposed experiences of 
globalization for capital and labor, with the former empowered to cross national 
borders with increasing ease and the latter increasingly restricted from doing so, low-
wage labor migrants commonly pursue these opportunities without official government 
authorization. As a result, they experience what Saskia Sassen (2014: 29, emphasis in 
original) describes as ‘expulsions—from life projects and livelihoods, from 
membership, from the social contract at the center of liberal democracy’. Expelled 
from their home countries by the globalized pursuit of profit within a neoliberal 
agenda, they are similarly ‘expelled’ or excluded from meaningful social membership 
in their destination country, where low-wage labor fails to earn them the mutual 
obligation implied by the social contract. 
The cultural and policy dynamics that enable this exclusion have been described by 
Juliet Stumpf (2006: 396–397) as crimmigration, a description of the increasing 
overlap between criminal and immigration law and their respective systems and 
functions: ‘[b]oth systems act as gatekeepers of membership in our society, 
determining whether an individual should be included or excluded’. Robert Koulish 
(2010: 56) identifies neoliberalism as a specific driver of crimmigration: 
A grand irony of neoliberal democracy is that the minimal state, its hallmark, gains legitimacy 
by becoming an almost pervasive presence in people’s lives. […] [A]lthough market ideology 
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suggests the market is society’s most efficient regulator, the market draws immigrants into the 
country and is much less effective at excluding them once they have arrived. 
While Koulish appears to conflate immigrant labor participation with social inclusion, 
the genius of contemporary US neoliberalism is its ability to separate and oppose 
economic inclusion from social exclusion, in a process Jock Young described as ‘social 
bulimia’ (Brotherton and Naegler, 2014; Young, 1999). The combination of the 
culturally situated nativism of US conservatives and the punitive policy agenda of the 
authoritarian state they support makes this dichotomy possible. Similar to Kitty 
Calavita’s (2005) concept of ‘subordinated inclusion’, Young’s ‘social bulimia’ is 
functionally distinct in its reliance on the ever-present threat of physical removal 
through deportation and detention—existential conditions described as deportability 
and detainability by scholars such as De Genova (2016) and Leyro (2013, 2017). 
Neoliberal punishment : The evolut ion of inst rumentalist  
penalit y 
Neoliberal approaches to criminal justice system punishment provide the template for 
the USA’s current punitive approach to immigration control. Bernard Harcourt (2010: 
7, emphases in original) asserts that: 
The key to understanding our contemporary punishment practices […] turns on the 
emergence in the 18th century of the idea of natural order and the eventual metamorphosis of 
this idea, over the course of the 20th century, into the concept of market efficiency.  
Harcourt positions criminal justice system punishment as an essential feature of post-
industrial political economy, the consequential end of a legal system designed ‘to 
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange—the 
“market”, explicit or implicit’ (Posner, 1985: 1195). This furthers the argument put 
forth by Sayer (2014) about the obscuring nature of the neoliberal approach to 
language: the overwhelmingly restrictive penal regime of mass incarceration as 
necessary to facilitate the ‘freedom’ of market exchange. Recognizing the paradox, 
Harcourt (2011a) responds to the argument that the neoliberal logic of market 
efficiency militates against the bureaucratic bloat of contemporary mass incarceration: 
[M]ass incarceration during this period of post-industrial economic depression, with real 
unemployment around 17.7% and nothing but a service economy left, can relatively easily be 
justified on a cost–benefit basis. It all depends on what value we place on intangibles like 
liberty, coercion, human capital, human misery, being unemployed, prison economies, the 
cost of crime, etc. […] Within [the] political economy [of mass incarceration], cost–benefit 
analysis involves complex political decisions, not neutral costing or accounting principles. 
Despite neoliberalism’s ideological adherence to market (i.e. fiscal or economic) 
efficiency, its real-world application is dependent upon the political economic context 
in which it is applied. Mass incarceration is essential to the provision of an institutional 
framework appropriate to the practice of free market economics in as many policy 
spheres as possible. As such, it is appropriate to neoliberal governance, despite 
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restricting individual freedom by its very design. The concept of individual freedom 
prized under this framework excludes the freedom to circumvent market exchange 
through criminal activity. 
Despite the fact that ‘the free market, governed by “natural order,” is insulated from 
punishment’, the converse is not the case. Rather, ‘[t]he punishment field […] is wide 
open not only to government intervention, but to profit and economics as well’ 
(Harcourt, 2011b: 237); private/for-profit prisons and prison labor support this claim. 
Many of the same corporations active in the private/for-profit prison industry expanded 
heavily into immigrant detention in the early 21st century, enhancing their profitability 
and extending the logic of crimmigration into every aspect of the systems’ parallel 
conditions of confinement. Contemporary US immigration control, like mass 
incarceration, is both subject to the free market logic of neoliberal ideology and an 
artifact of its contemporary political economic context. It also restricts individual 
freedom in order to define the edges of the acceptable in free market exchange. 
The polit ical economy of punishment  
From a penological perspective, the structural purpose of contemporary US 
immigration control can best be understood through the lens of Rusche and 
Kirchheimer’s political economy of punishment. The theory’s premise, as outlined 
above, received comparatively little attention until its extensive treatment in Michel 
Foucault’s (1977) Discipline and Punish. Foucault argued that: ‘[contemporary] 
systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain ‘political economy’ of the body: 
[…] its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission’. In 
Foucault’s (1977: 25–26) reading, the disciplined body is a productive body, whose 
‘constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of 
subjection’. The most effective systems of discipline are imprinted on the mind, 
internalized by their object. The imprint of ‘illegal’ status is just such a system, 
carrying with it the constant threat of deportation in consequence for any deviation 
from productive labor. The contemporary undocumented US immigrant bears her 
illegality through the physical displays of race, ethnicity, and culture, a complementary 
system of external and internal markings that subjects her actions to the invisible 
discipline of the ‘market.’ In practical terms this means that both she and anyone with 
whom she may be interacting understand that, should she attempt to assert an 
alternative identity (such as community member, parent, resident, or otherwise rights-
bearing human subject), she risks being punished by deportation. 
The internalized concept of illegality supports the contemporary neoliberal project 
of inequality by instrumentalizing immigrant labor. Dario Melossi’s interpretation of 
the political economy of punishment supports Foucault’s in arguing that early modern 
incarceration constituted ‘disciplinary training for capitalist production’ (Melossi and 
Pavarini, 1981: 21). With the industrial era ‘capitalist production’ of Fordist value-
added manufacturing replaced by neoliberal rent-seeking, the contemporary US context 
requires different disciplines for different populations. For a low-wage labor force of 
unauthorized and undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants, the 
‘disciplinary training’ implied by illegality, detention, and deportation is one of 
instability, servility, and exclusion. Undocumented laborers are, in effect, being trained 
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to accept the suspension of the traditional social contract, to internalize illegality and 
the status of the permanent ‘other’ that accompanies it. 
This reading incorporates the ideas of the Russian legal scholar EB Pashukanis, who 
contended that, in addition to ‘its uses as a repressive instrument of class domination, 
[punishment] also operates as an ideological apparatus, helping to reproduce the mental 
and cultural categories on which capitalist rule depends’ (Garland, 1991: 131). Such 
categories are essential to the organization of productive relationships. As Ruth Wilson 
Gilmore (2007: 32) illustrates in Golden Gulag, her seminal work on California’s 
neoliberal prison-building boom: 
[D]ominant Anglos organized labor and propertied classes according to Black–white, 
European–non-European, and Protestant–Catholic hierarchies […]. Through legislative edicts 
and institutional practices, state, capital, and labor power blocs manipulated the unique 
characteristics of the population to designate […] members, servants, and enemies [...] 
Illegality, as a successor and supplement to racial, ethnic, and national categories, is 
commonly conceived as a legal status; it is most importantly a cultural one. Created by 
the socially bulimic pattern of invitation and expulsion established with the historical 
pairing of the Bracero Program and Operation Wetback (Calavita, 1992; Kanstroom, 
2007), ‘a person obtains [the] status [of illegal immigrant] by falling outside of the 
affirmatively defined categories of membership, in other words, by the absence of legal 
status’ (Varsanyi, 2011: 305–306, emphasis in original). The cultural category implied 
by ‘illegal immigrant/alien’ is one of legal non-personhood, reproduced in the 
dominant culture, and reinterpreted as a mental category in the psychology of the 
undocumented immigrants who are its object, through the constant threat of punitive 
immigration control. 
Gilmore (2007: 55) characterizes the overlapping systems of punitive incarceration 
and immigration control as systemic responses to a crisis of surplus, brought on by the 
transition from the economic paradigm of Keynesian full employment, to the post-
industrial, Friedmanian paradigm of sustained ‘natural’ unemployment: ‘implicit in 
capital’s imperative to accumulate is an equal necessity to disaccumulate. Systemic 
failure to disaccumulate constitutes crisis.’ The ‘surplus’ is in this case the population 
of disengaged and discarded laborers who need to be ‘contained, if not deported […] to 
prison or abroad’, allowing employers to ‘exploit actual and implied undocumented 
workers’ political powerlessness’ (Gilmore, 2007: 77). In this sense, the practice of 
punishment can be understood as a political rationality of neoliberal government, ‘not 
“government” as an institution […] but as the activity that consists in governing 
people’s conduct within the framework of, and using the instruments of, a state’ 
(Dardot and Laval, 2013 [2009]: 5). 
In addition to its role facilitating labor exploitation, detention presents unique 
opportunities for ‘rent-seeking’, not only among private/for-profit prison providers, but 
also for a host of secondary service providers and subcontractors (Trujillo-Pagan, 2014). 
Private/for-profit prison providers like the former Corrections Corporation of 
America3 have increasingly relied on the income associated with immigrant detention 
to maintain profitability in the face of declining occupancy rates in their state and 
federal contracts for regular criminal justice system incarceration. With the average 
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daily cost of detaining an individual immigrant estimated at $159 (National 
Immigration Forum, 2013)—more than three times the concurrent average contracted 
amount for state prisoners—the strategy has been highly successful, allowing CCA to 
maintain or increase its operating margins in the face of falling occupancy rates (see 
Table 1) (Corrections Corporation of America, 2013). 
Rescaling immigrat ion cont rol: Punishment , profit , and public–
pr ivate par tnerships through local policy ent repreneurship 
‘[T]he decentralization, diffusion, and pluralization of enforcement’ (Walsh, 2014: 241) has 
manifested in immigration control as increasing localization since the 1996 passage of 
IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (US House 
of Representatives, 1996)). This rescaling has occurred in the context of the broader 
devolution of federal authority (as an aspect of the ‘rollout neoliberalism’ of the 1980s and 
1990s) to states and localities (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Gilmore (2007: 81) points to 
‘declines of 12.5 percent (state) to 60 percent (local) in revenues derived from federal aid’ 
in California during this period as evidence of a general deligitimation of the Keynesian 
state. In Varsanyi’s (2011: 297) reading, ‘the transition from the [Fordist] Keynesian 
welfare state to the neoliberalizing state […] has […] decentered the nation-state as the pre-
eminent sociopolitical container in the contemporary political economy’, allowing state, 
county, and municipal governments to take on ‘policy entrepreneurship’ in spheres 
previously the sole purview of a strong federal government. Gilmore (2007: 78) suggests 
that newly empowered state and local governments have to balance the needs of local 
capital interests against a more narrow voting public: ‘[i]nsofar as the capitalist state must 
both help capital be profitable, and keep the formal inequality of capitalism acceptable to 
the polity […], it develops fiscal, institutional, and ideological means to carry out these 
tasks’. Thus nativist immigration policy activism through locally controlled immigration 
enforcement and the passage of restrictive local ordinances serves the bulimic process of 
labor inclusion/social exclusion. Rather than focusing on unauthorized immigrants as 
laborers (the role in which they benefit capital), many restrictive local ordinances focus on 
circumscribing immigrants’ rights as community members.4 Cultural expressions of 
nativism by working class white voters may be intended to contest the perceived effects of 
globalization, but when translated into government action are subverted into a form that 
ultimately supports neoliberalism’s economic goals. 
The polit ical economy of contemporary punishment  
The theories of the punishment marketplace and punishment entrepreneurship take into 
account four characteristic features of contemporary economic relations that set the 21st-
century neoliberal order apart from the 20th-century Fordist industrialism that preceded it: 
(1) the increasing abstraction, due primarily to technological advances, of the 
nature of labor on the one hand, and capital investment on the other; 
(2) the growing dislocation between laborer and consumer roles in contemporary 




(3) the clientization of worker/consumers in their relationships with corporate 
capital, as an aspect of the transition from an industrial to a service-based 
economy; 
(4) the marketization by capital interests of diverse spheres of human interaction, 
from the political and social spheres to cultural and legal ones, and the 
increasing application of entrepreneurial objectives to human interactions not 
formerly subject to market logic. 
Each of these individual features has some bearing on contemporary modes of 
punishment. The central theme of Rusche’s theory is that criminal justice system 
punishment (specifically in the form of incarceration) functions as a deterrent—not to 
the commission of future crimes, but to the attempts of those individuals who form ‘the 
lowest strata of the laboring classes’ (Melossi, 2003: xi) to improve their situation—
that is, to achieve some advantage in their interactions with capital5 through recourse to 
the underground economy (to circumvent the rules of free market exchange, per 
Harcourt), through labor organizing, or any other activity that: (1) disrupts their ready 
availability as a cheap and flexible labor force; or (2) represents an attempt to 
circumvent free market exchange. 
In the globalized, technologized, neoliberal service economy, however, the value of 
punishment as a form of labor force discipline becomes diffuse. How should this 
disciplinary effect function in a paradigm lacking obvious ‘legitimate’ labor force roles 
for the lowest socioeconomic strata? Its multiple functions are in fact defined by the 
four changes in contemporary economic relations outlined above, of which the most 
important to the context of punitive immigration control is clientization. The others 
serve to make this clientization profitable: the abstraction of capital investment is a 
major contributor to the privatization that makes entrepreneurial approaches to 
immigration control possible, as described by Saskia Sassen (2014: 9): 
What is new and characteristic of our current era is the capacity of finance to develop 
enormously complex instruments that allow it to securitize the broadest-ever, historically 
speaking, range of entities and processes[.] While traditional banking is about selling money 
that the bank has, finance is about selling something it does not have. To do this, finance 
needs to invade—that is, securitize—nonfinancial sectors to get the grist for its mill. 
Abstracted capital investments, in other words, are at the root of the contemporary 
neoliberal economy’s movement toward marketization. In order to sell ‘financial 
products’ that they do not concretely possess, financial institutions must actively apply 
market logics and principles to sectors that operated previously on the basis of other 
principles. Examples such as the mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the 2007 
financial meltdown relied on the manipulation of consumer behaviors, through 
political, social, and cultural means. Low-income mortgage buyers were saddled with 
massive amounts of debt that—with no realistic expectation of ever being fully 
repaid—was then repackaged and sold at a value that was largely illusory, if not 
straightforwardly fraudulent.6 Punishment serves a multiplicity of functions in this 
context, holding the potential to condition value-generating behaviors across a range of 
life domains, rather than simply in the arena of labor. 
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Table 1. Total incarceration per 100k adults vs Corrections Corporation of America 
occupancy and operating margins, 2007–2012.[ AQ3]  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total incarceration per 
100k adults (% change 
from previous year) 
1000 (**) 1000 (0%) 980 (–2%) 960 (–2%) 940 (–2%) 920 (–2%) 
CCA occupancy (% 
change from previous 
year) 
98.2% (**) 95.5% (–2.7%) 90.6% (–4.9%) 90.2% (–.4%) 89.9% (–.3%) 88.2% (–1.7%) 
CCA operating 
margin (% change 
from previous year) 
34.2% (**) 35.1% (+.9%) 30.6% (–4.5%) 30.6% (+/–0%) 34.3% (+3.7%) 36.3% (+2%) 
Clientization is a term originally coined by Clifford Geertz to describe the basic 
relationship between buyer and seller that defines the contemporary service economy—
‘the tendency for repetitive purchasers of particular goods and services to establish 
continuing relationships with particular purveyors of them, rather than search widely 
through the market at each occasion of need’ (Geertz, 1978: 30). In the contemporary 
context, factors such as contractual provisions and monopolies tend to empower the 
provider over the consumer in these exchanges. The term can also characterize the 
parallel relationship between the institutionalized and the ‘total institutions’ that 
confine them (Goffman, 2007 [1961]). Here the state is the consumer, the ‘client’ its 
ward, and the institution provides the ‘service’ of confinement. 
In clientized sectors, the ‘free market’ negotiation over the value of a good or service 
is mediated by a contractually defined relationship, in which value may be legally 
established on the basis of incidental client characteristics—from the risk classification of 
a prisoner, to the unauthorized or ‘illegal’ status of a detained immigrant, to the ‘pre-
existing conditions’ of a patient. In many sectors that rely on this model, particularly 
when payment is supplied by a third party (government, in most cases), profit is 
dependent on the cost difference between the services contracted and the services actually 
provided. Labor costs in these sectors may be secondary to the characteristics of 
individual clients upon which contracted pricing structures depend. The relationships that 
give rise to third party/government contracts for various kinds of client services are 
dependent upon marketization and predominate in such marketized government sectors as 
benefit distribution and health care (particularly Medicaid and Medicare). 
Late modern incarceration is another clientized market, with prisoners in the client 
role and private prisons providing the service—often with subcontractors providing 
secondary services such as health care, food services, and so on. Contemporary US 
punishment uses state coercion to force individuals with a limited value as laborers into 
the position of prisoner-clients (or probationer-clients, parolee-clients, etc.). Profit is 
dependent upon ‘selling’ the maximum public benefit (i.e. of incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, or removal) to the government payer while minimizing the actual 
provision of services. The higher costs for civil detention of immigrants are ostensibly 
dependent upon the additional human rights claims of unconvicted detainees; with no 
enforcement mechanism sufficient to ensure these claims are translated into actual 
services, detention providers convert these claims directly into profits ( Homeland 
Security Advisory Council, 2016; Office of the Inspector General, US Department of 
Justice, 2016; Schriro, 2013). 
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Table 2. Variable values and factor ranks for the states of Georgia and New Jersey, 2008–
2012. 
Variable AVG AVG  AVG AVG AVG COT 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008–2012 
GA NJ GA NJ GA NJ GA NJ GA NJ GA NJ 
Market scale (factor rank) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 
Total population of unauthorized 
immigrants (in thousands) 
475 550 425 450 425 550 432 526 400 525 –75 –25 
Non-citizens as a proportion of 
total population 
.062 .099 .061 .101 .064 .102 .063 .102 .062 .103 –.000 +.004 
Unauthorized immigrants as a 
proportion of total labor force 
.063 .092 .069 .085 .070 .086 .072 .096 .056 .082 –.007 –.010 
Econ Anxiety (factor rank) 4 2 4 2 5 3 5 2 5 3 4 4 
Proportion of labor force 
unemployed 
.064 .054 .098 .091 .107 .093 .101 .094 .091 .095 +.027 +.041 
Proportion of unauth population 
not participating in labor force 
.32 .23 .29 .22 .24 .27 .29 .24 .31 .24 –.01 +.01 
Punitiveness (factor rank) 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 1 5 1 2 2 
Incarceration rate per 100,000 
population 
542 305 533 297 560 284 547 270 542 261 0 –44 
Number of prisoners held in 
private facilities 
5146 2682 5129 2950 5233 2841 5615 2887 7900 2717 +2285 +35 
Proportion of total legislative seats 
held by Republicans 
.593 .408 .589 .408 .589 .417 .631 .408 .640 .383 +.047 –.025 
Local enforcement entrepreneurship 
(rank) 
5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 
Average daily population of 
detained immigrants 
1822 1147 1975 1232 2044 1370 2376 1629 2414 2000 +592 +853 
Total number of 287(g) 
memoranda of understanding 
4 1 5 2 5 3 5 3 5 3 +1 +2 
Proportion of jurisdictions with 
active Secure Communities 
MOA[ AQ4]  
.00 .00 .02 .00 .06 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 1.00 +1.00 +1.00 
Operat ionalizing the punit ive immigrat ion control marketplace: 
Localized immigrat ion enforcement in Georgia and New Jersey, 
2008–2012 
The workings of the punishment marketplace and punitive immigration control 
encompass broad and overlapping sociocultural and political-economic practices, 
policies, and attitudes. In an attempt to rectify what Coleman and Stuesse (2016: 524) 
call the ‘disconnect between […] theories of power and the actually existing bodies and 
spaces that these theories are said to represent’, I present two brief case studies of 
punitive immigration control marketplaces, in the culturally, historically, and 
geographically distinct states of Georgia and New Jersey. I present first a suite of 
quantitative statistics for each state (Table 2), drawn from a larger empirical analysis 
undertaken in 2017; these statistics, in brief, show the two states’ pentile rankings on 
local enforcement and factors of market scale, punitiveness, and economic anxiety for 
the years 2008–2012, along with the constituent variables from which these factors 
were calculated. Both states, despite their disparate histories, cultures, and geographies, 
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show high-volume and growing local immigration enforcement marketplaces 
(generally ranking 4 or 5 out of 5 on this factor in measures of both annual averages, 
and increase over time). Using sources from investigative journalism and advocacy 
group reports, I attempt to illustrate how enforcement entrepreneurship in the states 
developed over the five-year period under examination, and show how these 
enforcement marketplaces are shaped by local policy-making, lobbying, administrative 
decisions, and other actions undertaken in the entrepreneurial pursuit of benefit. 
Both a ‘new destination’ state for 21st-century unauthorized immigrants and one of 
the anchors of the conservative Southern ‘Bible Belt’, Georgia’s state government has 
closely followed the neoliberal economic blueprint of widespread privatization, 
reduced public services, and corporate subsidies; its current Governor, Nathan Deal, 
‘has emphasized time and again that he believes it is the role of government to get out 
of the way and let the private sector stimulate the economy’ (Semuels, 2015). 
This approach has required high incarceration rates to condition Georgia’s low-
income population to consistently high unemployment, minimal benefits, and low 
wages. Georgia began privatizing its correctional system in 1997, contracting with the 
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) for the construction and operation of three 
for-profit prisons. An additional contract with the GEO Group brought a 1500-bed 
privately owned and operated facility online in late 2011. Together, these facilities held 
roughly 8000 prisoners by the end of 2012, about 14 percent of the state’s total 
incarcerated population. CCA reports that its two Georgia facilities are among its most 
profitable, along with a detailed description of how it ensured this profitability: 
In December 2009, CCA also entered into an Economic Development Agreement with […] 
Coffee County, Georgia to implement a tax abatement plan related to CCA’s bed expansion 
project at its Coffee Correctional Facility […] for 100% abatement of real property taxes for 
five years. Under the plan, legal title of CCA’s real property was transferred to Coffee 
County. In December 2009, Coffee County issued bonds in a maximum principal amount of 
$33.0 million. The bonds were issued to CCA, so no cash exchanged hands. Coffee County 
then leased the real property back to CCA. The lease payments are equal to the amount of the 
payments on the bonds. At any time, CCA has the option to purchase the real property by 
paying off the bonds, plus $100. 
 
(Corrections Corporation of America, 2013) 
CCA not only arranged to pay zero property taxes on its Coffee County facility for five 
full years, but also arranged to receive a $33 million loan, in the form of a Coffee 
County bond issuance, to expand the facility. The County secured the loan, and CCA 
paid only the interest on the bonds, meaning Coffee County receives no tax or rent 
revenues for the facility that it legally owns. 
The development of immigrant detention in Georgia has followed similar patterns 
and involved many of the same corporate players. CCA owned and operated two of the 
four major detention centers active in Georgia as of 2012; the third private/for-profit 
facility is the Irwin County Detention Center, which came online roughly in the middle 
of this study’s data window (December 2010), accounting for much of the increase in 
Georgia’s detainee population from 2010 to 2012. Its corporate owner and manager, 
Detention Management, LLC, and the process that led to its contract with ICE,7 were 
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the subject of a 2012 investigation by The Nation (Rappleye and Riordan Seville, 
2012). The investigation found that its five principals all had long and checkered 
histories in both the private/for-profit and public corrections fields, but sufficient 
influence to lobby two of Georgia’s influential elected officials to pressure ICE to 
provide detainees to fill the Irwin facility. In response, ICE officials wrote that ‘“[w]e 
can move a hundred women out of Etowah [detention facility in Etowah County, 
Alabama], and replace them with a hundred others. […] Not a zero-sum issue.” […] 
ICE would simply find more “bodies” to fill the beds’ (Rappleye and Riordan Seville, 
2012). ICE was supported in this endeavor by local Georgia officials through the 
287(g) and Secure Communities8 immigration enforcement programs. According to the 
ACLU’s 2012 report Prisoners of profit,[ AQ5]  ‘[t]he majority of immigrant detainees 
[…] were detained after being stopped for traffic violations throughout Georgia’, 
echoing the findings of Coleman and Stuesse (2016: 535), whose ‘data showed that a 
number of agencies—especially those identified by immigrant rights groups as tough 
on undocumented communities—were heavily involved in the use of driver’s license 
roadblocks’. 
The political-economic benefit for elected sheriffs engaging in federal–local 
enforcement partnerships is also on display in New Jersey, where immigration has 
remained a consistent social reality for centuries. After the 1965 Immigration Act, 
immigration to New Jersey diversified, such that large contemporary communities of 
Dominicans, Cubans, Haitians, Koreans, South Americans, South Asians, Chinese, and 
other ethnic groups define the character of neighborhoods and towns across the state 
(Shaw, 1994). Nativism, however, has remained a significant force in state politics and 
culture: a 2009 Monmouth University poll—a year when non-citizens made up over a 
tenth of the state’s population, and unauthorized immigrants close to a tenth (8.5 
percent) of the state’s workforce—over half of the respondents characterized ‘illegal 
immigration’ as a ‘very serious’ problem, and some 62 percent opposed granting 
‘illegal immigrants’ the right to hold even a ‘limited’ driver’s license (Monmouth 
University/Gannett New Jersey Poll, 2009). Nativism arguably played a role in the 
election of Monmouth County Sheriff Kim Guadagno—a former federal prosecutor—
who in 2009 fulfilled a campaign promise to enter the county into a 287(g) agreement 
with ICE. 
In addition to the apparent electoral benefit to Sheriff Guadagno, Monmouth 
County’s 287(g) agreement provided direct fiscal benefit through the Monmouth 
County Jail’s detention agreement with ICE: in 2009, it held an average daily 
population of 150 immigrant detainees. In 2010—after Guadagno’s implementation of 
287(g)—this number jumped by 100, reaching 280 by 2012. Guadagno’s history and 
connections as a federal prosecutor—as with the principals of Irwin County’s 
Detention Management—provided a competitive edge to Monmouth County’s 
immigration enforcement entrepreneurship, and allowed the Sheriff to stack both 
political benefits and direct fiscal benefits through judicious application of the 
enforcement tools available to her. Guadagno’s savvy use of immigration as a political 
lever has continued to serve her ambitions: at the time of writing she was the 
Republican nominee for New Jersey’s 2017 gubernatorial election. Economically, 
however, the doubling of Monmouth’s immigrant detainee population is exceeded by 
the increase achieved in nearby Essex County, whose jail held just 42 detainees in 
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2008—the first year of its contract with ICE—and nearly 600 four years later. Through 
their entrepreneurial entries into the immigration enforcement marketplace, each 
county achieved annual revenue increases in the tens of millions over the first four 
years of the Obama administration. 
Punit ive immigrat ion cont rol under  t he author it ar ian state 
These case studies show a US immigration enforcement marketplace driven by outlier 
states, and in turn by entrepreneurial outlier counties within them. Immigrants, 
undocumented or otherwise, are not evenly distributed among the nation’s states and 
counties; nor is nativist sentiment a universally reliable driver of votes or other kinds of 
political support. Perhaps most importantly, the entrepreneurial acumen and 
accumulative motivation that appears typical of the actors described in the case studies 
above are not evenly distributed across individuals in positions of power within local 
governments, regardless of their political ambitions. The nature of entrepreneurship is 
innovation; Sheriff Guadagno may not have had the technical knowledge or contacts 
necessary to enter Monmouth County into a 287(g) agreement if not for her 
background as a federal prosecutor. Ultimately, local government entrepreneurship in 
the punitive immigration control marketplace has not needed to be geographically 
widespread or evenly distributed to negatively impact the lives of many thousands of 
immigrants, along with their families and communities. 
Having opened this piece, however, with the argument that the Trump 
administration’s immigration enforcement policies represent a continuity from those of 
its predecessors, it is important to acknowledge that the potential harms inherent to 
these policies are progressing at a rate and to a degree that few predicted. The 
administration’s authoritarian approach represents an expanded and inviting framework 
for the kind of state- and local-level entrepreneurial entries into the punishment 
marketplace explored above. Comparing the federal response to Texas’ recent SB4 
anti-immigration law to that which met Arizona’s similar SB1070 in 2010 will provide 
a useful litmus test on the federal government’s potential to intensify, rather than 
mitigate, the social harms of punishment entrepreneurship. That SB4 specifically 
targets ‘sanctuary cities’ is particularly cogent in this respect. The assertion by state 
and local governments of humanistic alternatives to the neoliberal/neoconservative 
value system that drives discourse on public goods may represent a meaningful site of 
resistance to authoritarian neoliberal governance. In Bruff’s (2014: 127) conception, 
‘the mobilization of juridical power against such [resistance] […] alert[s] us to how 
inequalities of power are produced and reproduced in capitalist societies, [but] also 
enable[s] us to consider more fully how other worlds are possible’. Policy innovation 
need not be entrepreneurial, accumulative, instrumentalizing; governance frameworks 
can be built on values other than market competition. It may be that an experience of 
authoritarian rule will provide the stark reminder of these alternative values that US 
democracy requires to enact them. 
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1. The recent work of Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2014) indicates that economic elites 
exert more real influence on US government policy than any other interest group. 
2. Definitive work from Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Peri (2016) appears to refute the 
argument that immigration control has positive labor market effects for native-born workers. 
3. Corrections Corporation of America rebranded in October 2016 as CoreCivic, marking the 
‘culmination of [a] multi-year strategy to transform into [a] diversified government 
solutions company’ (Davis, 2016) and arguably providing further evidence of the 
deliberately obscuring nature of neoliberal language use. 
4. Of 1143 state immigration laws passed from 2010–2015, some 131 (11 percent) related to 
employment, as opposed to 78 (7 percent) on public benefits, 178 (16 percent) on law 
enforcement, and 151 (13 percent) on ID/driver’s licenses. While no empirical conclusions 
can be drawn from this breakdown—the laws are not categorized as pro- or anti-immigrant, 
local county or municipal ordinances are not included, there is no detail about their 
objectives or enforcement mechanisms—the data do not give the impression of a wave of 
restrictive legislative activism targeting employers (NCSL, 2016). 
5. In the ‘competitive’ Marxist capital–labor dialectic, the two constituent groups have 
different goals: ‘labor’ represents individual workers seeking advantage in pursuit of ‘life 
projects’ (expansively defined), while capital represents corporate interests with more 
purely profit-driven/accumulative goals. While it is important to recognize that capital 
incorporates individual members of the political-economic elite with ‘life projects’ of their 
own, the contemporary structure of neoliberal capitalism obscures capital behind a corporate 
collective, while labor’s ability to take a collective approach (i.e. through unionization) is 
actively suppressed. 
6. Few of the financiers responsible for this fraud were ever prosecuted, in contrast to the 
steady march of harsh punishments directed at the poor in an era when rates of street-level 
crime are at their lowest in half a century. Instead, the Justice Department pursued civil 
actions against a number of banks and other financial institutions at the center of the 
mortgage crisis, achieving fines and financial settlements that, despite setting records, 
generally amounted to less than the paying institution’s typical profits for a single quarter. 
For more on this topic, see journalist Matt Taibbi’s (2014) book, The Divide: American 
Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap. 
7. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the constituent agency of the US Department of 
Homeland Security responsible for all aspects of interior immigration control, including 
detention and deportation. 
8. The 287(g) program, named for the section of the 1996 IIRIRA where it appears, allows 
local law enforcement agencies to enforce immigration law through a formal agreement 
with ICE. The Secure Communities program—now defunct—allowed local LEAs[ AQ6]  to 
automatically share identifying data on arrestees with ICE, which in turn could request that 
deportable arrestees be detained for transfer into ICE custody. 
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